Sri Lanka: Mine Action in
a Deteriorating Environment
A major mine-action program has been underway in Sri Lanka since 2002, when a
cease-fire agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam was signed. However, after a seemingly inexorable escalation in violent guerrilla tactics used by the LTTE, open warfare resumed, and in May 2009, the
government announced that it had achieved military victory over the LTTE. This article traces the various ways that the increase in conflict affected mine-action activities in Sri Lanka.

by Chris Rush [ Geneva Call ]

T

he cease-fire agreement and peace talks
The presence of anti-personnel landmines
between the government of Sri Lanka in areas where the displaced would resettle was
and LTTE seemed to offer the possi- a major hindrance to rehabilitation efforts, 3 as
bility of an end to a decades-long, catastrophic these devices were utilized extensively by both
conflict. Some 683,000
sides in previous phases
persons were internalof the conflict. The exact
ly displaced, of whom
number of landmines
more than 174,000 lived
that had been laid was
in welfare centers and reunknown, but it was essettlement villages when
timated to be between
the cease-fire was signed.
1.5 and 2 million.4
The agreement recogThe issue grew increasnized “the importance of
ingly urgent as people
improving living condibegan spontaneously retions for all inhabitants
turning to their homes.3
affected by the conflict,”1
While neither the govand in this respect, the
ernment of Sri Lanka nor
return of IDPs and rehathe LTTE had renounced
bilitation of war-affected
the use of anti-personnel
areas were clear and immines3—allowing the posA marked minefield in northern Sri Lanka.
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mediate priorities. Insibility of the future use of
ternational organizations and donors agreed, these weapons in the event of renewed hostilities—
believing that such rehabilitation offered oppor- donor governments and institutions felt that this
tunities for the displaced and allowed the po- stance should not be an impediment to supporttential to build confidence between the national ing mine action and provided a significant level of
government and LTTE.2
funding for mine-action activities.5
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A variety of agencies, both national and international, began
work on mine-action projects under
the coordination of Sri Lanka’s National Steering Committee for Mine
Action. Clearance of mine-affected
areas was one of the main priorities,
and a number of international agencies began clearing areas jointly
held by the government and LTTE.
There was optimism about the
possibility of swift mine-clearance
progress. Indeed, in the first few

cease-fire were characterized by a
general absence of credible allegations of the use of AP mines, the
reality changed as the situation deteriorated. In a meeting with Geneva
Call in 2005, the LTTE stated that it
fully recognized the importance of
removing mines, and promised that
new mines would not be emplaced.7
However, allegations of mine use
were levelled against the LTTE in
2006,8 and such claims were more
numerous and specific the following

Lanka consistently asserted that it
did not resume mine use.12
While the use of AP mines
is always a cause for concern, it
would be particularly disturbing if mines were laid in areas that
had previously been cleared and
deemed mine-safe. It is not apparent whether any of the alleged mine
use was in areas that had already
been cleared of mines, although at
least one of the apparently credible
allegations of AP mine use made

Clearly defined mined areas—mostly fenced and
marked—led to a Level Two Survey being conducted
in just six months, a task described as “impossible in
any other country.”
years after the cease-fire was signed,
the optimism seemed well-placed;
for instance, it was noted that clearly defined mined areas—mostly
fenced and marked—led to a Level Two Survey 6 being conducted in
just six months, a task described as
“impossible in any other country.”5
In 2004, the Sri Lankan government
set a target of achieving a mine-free
country by the end of 2006.4 However, after the LTTE pulled out of
peace talks in 2003, there was a
gradual worsening of relations between the parties to the conflict.
Initially, this animosity resulted in
isolated and sporadic outbreaks of
violence, but there was a more rapid
escalation in conflict beginning in
2006, with more or less open warfare ensuing the following year. This
fighting culminated in the abrogation of the cease-fire by the government of Sri Lanka in January 2008.
The use of AP mines is illustrative of the changing tactics of the
LTTE. While the early years of the

year.9 The LTTE denied all charges,9
and the organization asserted that
if mines were still being laid, it was,
in fact, government forces that were
laying them.10
From the information available, it was difficult to truly evaluate
mine use in the country, so in 2006,
Geneva Call wrote to both the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE
to request approval of a mission to
investigate and verify the allegations. It should be emphasized that
because neither party had banned
the use of landmines, they had no
obligation to approve such a course
of action. Still, it was disappointing when neither party agreed to the
proposed verification mission.9 Although the allegations of the postcease-fire agreement mine use were
mainly against the LTTE, the Landmine Monitor asserted in 2008 that
“knowledgeable sources … have alleged that Sri Lankan security forces
used AP mines in 2007 and 2008.”11
Nevertheless, the government of Sri

against the LTTE was in the center
of a village that had been resettled
after a previous round of fighting,
and it was subsequently evacuated
again.13 Because the LTTE still had
not renounced AP mine use, Geneva Call urged the LTTE, at the very
least, to refrain from laying mines in
areas that had already been cleared
of AP mines.11
Reduced Operational Effectiveness

Mine action became increasingly
hampered by the escalation of conflict, and the deterioration of the situation affected ongoing mine-action
activities in a variety of interconnected ways. By 2006, those agencies
that were working in LTTE-controlled areas were citing the security
situation as a reason for slower-thanexpected implementation of mineclearance activities.14 In these areas,
the work of mine-action agencies was
reportedly disrupted by the recruitment, both voluntary and forced, of
staff by “local security forces.”11
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In government-controlled areas,
the volatile security situation also
affected mine-clearance activities, with
operations reportedly being affected by
the surge in violence.11 The Landmine
Monitor noted that the operating environment was becoming increasingly
ineffective because of tighter controls
on the movement of people, equipment and supplies.11 The imposition of
work permits for expatriate workers reportedly affected the operations of humanitarian agencies.15 The movement
of mine-clearance equipment into
LTTE-controlled areas was reportedly
problematic even before the escalation
in conflict.16 However, it became even
more difficult as the situation deteriorated, and beginning in August 2006,
restrictions on the movement of various items, such as fuel, affected the effectiveness of mine-clearance agencies
operating in these areas. Of particular concern was the prohibition of the
movement of the personal protective
equipment utilized by deminers.17
While a number of agencies, including Norwegian People’s Aid, Swiss
Foundation for Mine Action, Danish
Demining Group and Mines Advisory Group, were initially operating
in LTTE-controlled areas in the north,
by 2007 only NPA still had the necessary permission from the government
to work there. However, in January
2008, NPA suspended operations, asserting that it had no choice in the matter because its Technical Advisors were
not granted permission to re-enter the
LTTE-controlled areas after a routine
stand-down in their operations.17 By
the end of 2008, NPA ceased its operations in Sri Lanka altogether.18
Loss of Mine-action Workers

Demining in Sri Lanka.
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Perhaps the starkest and most
unwelcome illustration of how the
deteriorating security environment

affected mine action is the violent
disappearance and death of mineaction staff. By any standards, Sri
Lanka has been a dangerous place
for humanitarian actors. Fortythree humanitarian workers have
reportedly been murdered in Sri
Lanka since the beginning of 2006,
while 20 more individuals were reported missing.19 Five of those murdered, and nine of those that have
disappeared, reportedly worked for
international mine-action agencies.
Most of the incidents occurred when
the staff members were off duty or
on the way to or from work. These
incidents, besides being abhorrent,
served to undermine the operational effectiveness of the agencies
in question. For instance, after the
murder of a DDG staff member in
Jaffna in August 2007, the organization suspended its operations for
nearly two weeks.11
With only a few exceptions, 20 affected agencies did not make public
comments about the deaths or disappearances of their staff. This reticence has been in stark contrast to
incidents that involved the killing
or abduction of other humanitarian
staff; these humanitarian agencies
issued statements condemning attacks, and where relevant, called for
the release of staff.
There may be a number of factors behind this different approach.
The author was told by a mine-action
program manager that an incident involving the abduction of a staff member of his agency did not necessitate
a response, as it was considered unlikely that the staff member had been
targeted because of his work for the
agency, but for other reasons unrelated to his professional life.21 In other
instances, mine-action agencies may
have viewed that issuing public state-

ments was not worthwhile, because
such measures had proved ineffective
in either stopping the killings or leading to the release of those abducted.
Furthermore, agencies may have also
been concerned that in an increasingly polarized situation, any comment
might be construed as critical of one
party or another, and would compromise their neutrality.
Shifting Priorities

The increase in conflict led to
the emergence of new needs for
mine-clearance expertise, particularly in respect to battle-area
clearance. In 2008, the Landmine
Monitor noted that mine action in
Sri Lanka had shifted from being a
development- and reconstructionrelated activity to being focused
largely on responding to immediate unexploded-ordnance and
mine-contamination threats.11

itarian—concerns, as the numbers of
displaced people received increased
international attention. Furthermore, some expressed skepticism
about the quality of clearance that
could be carried out within the newly imposed time frame.22
Withdrawal of Donor Support

Increasing concern about a drift
toward renewed conflict led to a
review of funding priorities by a
number of donors. Some governments decided that it was not appropriate to fund mine clearance at
a time when there was a real risk of
a resumption of mine use by either,
or both, of the involved parties.
Geneva Call was informed that the
Netherlands had withdrawn funding
for this reason,23 and later, Switzerland
followed suit.24 In a speech made to
commemorate the International Day
for Mine Awareness 2006, the U.K.

Forty-three humanitarian workers
have reportedly been murdered
in Sri Lanka since the beginning
of 2006, while 20 more individuals
were reported missing.
Some agencies expressed concerns about the prioritization of
tasks in this new environment. It
was felt that the National Steering
Committee for Mine Action had
been sidelined, and that decisions
about priorities were primarily made
by the military. It was reported that
there was pressure put on agencies to
concentrate their efforts on supporting the clearance of areas to allow for
the return of the recently displaced.
While positive in itself, one agency
felt that the prioritization was driven by political—rather than human-

Ambassador to Sri Lanka announced
that because Sri Lanka was still not a
signatory to the AP Mine Ban Convention, no more funds for mine clearance would be made available that
year. Furthermore, he stated that
unless there was progress toward a
ban, funding in the following year
would go toward survey activities
only. He stated, “This may appear a
tough line, but what is the point of
financing the lifting of landmines
only to see them being put back into
the ground when conflict recurs or
security demands [use of mines]?”25
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The approach of linking funding to progress toward an AP mine
ban was not unanimously accepted.
The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, which operated humanitariandemining teams in LTTE-controlled
areas, expressed that the pressure
placed on parties involved in the
conflict to make mine-ban commitments amounted to “politicization”
of mine-action funding, and that it
led to very short-term funding and
was problematic for agencies carrying out the work.26
During the early years of the
cease-fire, there were a number of
national and international actors involved in attempts to convince the
parties to move toward a ban on the
use of AP mines. However, progress
was limited; the government linked
accession to the AP Mine Ban Convention to reaching an agreement
with the LTTE over the “non-use”
of landmines, while the LTTE made
it clear that they would only consider banning the weapon if significant
progress toward peace was made.5
As the conflict escalated, the opportunities and prospects for advocacy were reduced. There was
increasing hostility to any initiative
that seemingly limited the means
and methods of warfare. Geneva
Call, which had been engaging the
LTTE in a ban on landmines with
the endorsement of the Sri Lankan
government,27 was soon no longer
granted permission by the government
to visit LTTE-controlled areas to proceed with this engagement.28 Later, the
organization was informed by the
government that it would not even
be granted the necessary permission
to enter the country. The Sri Lanka
Campaign to Ban Landmines was
basically inactive by 2006. Similarly,
the Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum
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ceased to function toward the end
of 2007. It is noteworthy that advocacy seems to have diminished at
the same time that allegations of renewed mine use were surfacing.
A general increase in hostility toward NGOs also affected agencies
involved in mine action. In 2006,
mine-clearance agencies operating in LTTE-controlled areas were
criticized for cooperating with the
Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation
at a time when the LTTE was carrying out attacks with commanddetonated “claymore” devices.29 It
is notable that despite the presence
of mine-action agencies in LTTEcontrolled areas—including at that
time the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, which was working under the coordination of the National
Steering Committee for Mine Action—
there was no public clarification by
government officials of the important humanitarian role played by the
mine-clearance agencies.
Conclusion

The escalation of conflict in Sri
Lanka profoundly affected mine action. Some of the challenges were
predictable, though others could not
have been foreseen. To ensure that
they remain effective, mine-action
agencies and donors working in the
context of ongoing conflict must be
able to carefully monitor and assess
developments, and respond quickly
and appropriately to new challenges
as, and when, they emerge. Similarly, affected states must ensure that,
even in the midst of conflict, they
strive to cultivate an environment
conducive to mine action. However, since the collapse of the LTTE in
May 2009, recent efforts have been
made to improve mine action. Organizations including UNICEF, U.N.
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Development Programme, Mines
Advisory Group and Handicap International are conducting mine action in Sri Lanka, with numerous
other projects taking place.30
See Endnotes, Page 77
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A boy looks at an NCBL brochure during a mine-risk education class conducted by NCBL in Bardiya district, Nepal.
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Mine-risk Education in Nepal, 2009
Despite the signing of a 2006 peace agreement by the Nepalese government and the
Maoists, Nepal’s mine clearance remains a work in progress due to the after-effects
of its decade-long Maoist conflict and the emergence of small, armed groups. Ban
Landmines Campaign Nepal (NCBL) is at the forefront of the country’s mine-riskeducation efforts. This article examines NCBL’s MRE program objectives, expectations, methods, and achievements, as well as the many challenges it faces.
by Purna Shova Chitrakar [ Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal ]

T

he Unified Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist) and the government of Nepal signed a comprehensive peace agreement on 21 November
2006. The tireless efforts of NCBL enabled
both parties to agree to incorporate important points on landmines and improvised
explosive devices into the CPA. The provi-

sion directs the parties to map landmines
and other explosive devices within 30 days
of the signing of the agreement and destroy
such mines and devices within 60 days. Despite this commitment, only 17 out of 53
minefields, and 99 out of more than 285
improvised-explosive-device fields were
cleared by mid-2009.
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